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Which Public? Whose Goods? What We
Know (and What We Don’t) About Public
Goods in Rural China
Sara A. Newland*
Abstract
What have we learned from a decade of research on the provision of public
goods in the Chinese countryside? This review article surveys the literature in
political science, economics and Chinese area studies. It describes the three
dominant types of explanations for variation in the quality of public goods:
local elections, social sanctioning and economic policies. It then argues that
these findings are plagued by a set of common problems. Scholars mean dif-
ferent things when they use the term “public goods,” making their findings
difficult to compare. Furthermore, the most common measures of public
goods ignore the ways in which local officials manipulate statistics to
enhance their career prospects and the interconnected nature of geo-
graphic-administrative units in the Chinese state. I suggest some ways to
address these problems, and make recommendations for new directions in
research on the topic.
Keywords: China; public goods; rural politics; political economy
After our first year in Sancha … Mimi and I donated one hundred dollars’ worth of cement to
the village, specifying that it could be used to make any necessary repairs to the new Sancha
road. The Party Secretary took the gift and paved a perfect sidewalk to her house, and now
she could ride her motorcycle all the way to the front door.
Peter Hessler (2010), Country Driving, 190–91
China’s staggering urban growth has largely left the countryside behind.1 First
used to subsidize the urban economy during the Maoist era, then left to stagnate
as decollectivization destroyed the limited rural social services that existed under
Mao, rural China has long been poor – and poorly served by local governments.
Yet, in the past decade a set of changes has converged to foster a sense of cau-
tious optimism among China-watchers that the situation might improve.
Investment in rural infrastructure has dramatically increased. Village elections
have become increasingly competitive, even if they remain imperfect,2 and
many villagers now exercise greater control over the management of village
* Department of political science, Villanova University. Email: sara.newland@villanova.edu.
1 Sicular et al. 2007; Yang 1999.
2 O’Brien and Han 2009.
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finances through the participatory decision-making model known as “one affair,
one discussion” (yi shi yi yi 一事一议).3 Policymakers have become more sympa-
thetic to the countryside; the Hu–Wen administration attempted to rebalance
China’s development strategy, implementing the “Building a new socialist coun-
tryside” (shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe 社会主义新农村建设) policies for
improving rural health care, modernizing agriculture and building infrastructure.
These changes – combined with the increased ease of survey research in rural
China – have inspired new research questions and created new data sources with
which to answer them. Has the combination of top-down pro-rural policies and
bottom-up accountability mechanisms improved the quality of public goods
and services in the Chinese countryside? If not, what problems have prevented
greater progress? Since 2004, numerous researchers have sought to answer
these questions, focusing on the effects of village elections, tax-for-fee reform,
social networks, officials’ promotion incentives and other factors on public
goods – although the county level, increasingly responsible for the provision of
public goods, remains understudied. What have we learned from a decade of
research on the provision of public goods in the Chinese countryside?4
Several points of agreement emerge.5 First, the direct election of village heads
has increased expenditure on village-level public goods and services. Second,
social ties to citizens compel village officials to expend effort and resources on
the provision of public goods and services. Third, changes in China’s economic
policies – among them tax-for-fee reform, the 2008–2009 economic stimulus
plan, an increase in the outsourcing of public services, and the recentralization
of rural finances and public service provision – have affected village leaders’ abil-
ity to provide public goods and services.
At the same time, existing studies often depart from the orthodox definition of
public goods, and disagree about how the provision of public goods should be
measured. Furthermore, the most commonly used measures in the quantitative
literature line up poorly with our qualitative knowledge of rural governance in
China. As a result, it is difficult to know what to make of these findings on
their own terms, and equally difficult to draw them into broader comparative
3 Göbel 2009.
4 A limited set of sources has addressed public goods provision in urban China (Solinger 1995; Teets
2012), but as this literature focuses on a different set of concerns, I exclusively address rural public
goods here.
5 To identify the set of relevant scholarly literature, I used two search methods. First, I searched the lead-
ing scholarly database Academic Search Premier (EBSCOHost) for peer-reviewed, English-language
sources published between 2004 and 2015 that contain the terms “rural” and “public goods” or “public
services” in the abstract, and that use China as a geographic keyword. This yielded a total of 48 sources,
of which 16 are relevant to this paper (several articles discussed China’s contribution to global public
goods such as collective security; others focused on urban China). Second, I searched Google Scholar
for sources published between 2004 and 2015 that contained “public goods” and “China” in the title.
This yielded 201 results, including duplicate citations and non-English-language sources. I manually lim-
ited the search results to English-language publications, and included unpublished working papers only
if they were cited by at least one source. This ultimately produced a list of 16 relevant sources. I also
thank two anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to several additional sources that shed
light on this topic without using the terminology of public goods.
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conversations about authoritarianism, local governance and provision of public
goods. This represents a lost opportunity. The study of local public goods provi-
sion is a growth industry in political science and economics, and the fact that
China faces the same challenges as many developing countries – but addresses
these challenges with a distinctive set of rural governance policies – makes
China a useful comparison case. However, existing scholarship on the provision
of public goods in China has largely focused on village leaders’ decisions about
resource allocation, and has ignored the questions about free-riding and cooper-
ation that are central to the study of the provision of public goods in other con-
texts. As a result, these literatures share a common term – public goods – but
otherwise have little to say to each other.
What Are Public Goods?
Public goods have two key properties: they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable
(see Table 1).6 One person’s use of a non-rivalrous good does not diminish its
availability to others; the clean air that I breathe does not make the air that
you breathe dirtier. Non-excludable goods benefit both those who contribute
and those who do not. For example, all of a country’s residents reap the rewards
of national defence regardless of whether they pay taxes that contribute to that
defence or not.
In combination, these two qualities mean that public goods pose particular
challenges that cannot be easily solved by market mechanisms; without govern-
ment intervention, they are likely to be underprovided relative to the population’s
demand for them. In particular, public goods are plagued by the free-rider
problem. Since non-contributors and contributors can benefit equally from public
goods, individuals have little incentive to pay their fair share. There is, therefore,
little profit to be made from providing public goods, and while demand for them
may be high, supply – if left to the market alone – will almost certainly be low.
While these problems mean that governments typically provide public goods,
particular attributes of local communities may either encourage citizens to
“carry their weight” or exacerbate the free-rider problem. Within close-knit com-
munities, the fear of social sanctioning may encourage citizens to contribute even
when pure self-interest would lead them to do otherwise. In rural Kenya, for
instance, parents could be compelled to donate to village schools if free riders
were socially sanctioned; ethnically homogenous communities were able to
implement these sanctions more effectively, and had better public goods as a
result.7 Similarly, strong norms of reciprocity within cultural groups may encour-
age seemingly selfless contributions to public goods.8 Finally, homogenous com-
munities may share policy and spending preferences to a greater degree than do
6 Samuelson 1954.
7 Miguel and Gugerty 2005.
8 Habyarimana et al. 2007.
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diverse communities. Citizens in culturally or ethnically homogenous areas may
thus be willing to pay their fair share, but those in more ethnically diverse areas
prefer to minimize public goods spending and instead pay privately for their pre-
ferred services.9
What We Know About the Past
The provision of public goods has since 1949 been one of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) regime’s greatest successes – and among its most notable failures.
The new communist leadership bought peasants’ loyalty with public health cam-
paigns, irrigation projects and basic medical care. Although these services were
rudimentary, they represented a significant improvement in areas where such
services had historically been non-existent. The provision of public goods was
gradually institutionalized through the work unit in urban areas and through the
collective in the countryside. The quality of rural public services ebbed and flowed
with the political tides during the Maoist era. The system for providing public
goods collapsed entirely during the Great Leap Forward and its tragic aftermath,
then experienced a resurgence with the revival of the Cooperative Medical
Scheme (hezuo yiliao zhidu 合作医疗制度) and the arrival of the “barefoot doc-
tors” during the Cultural Revolution.10 As Tony Saich rightly points out, it is dif-
ficult to know how to evaluate the effect of these early services, since many of their
gains were wiped out by the horror of the Great Leap famine.11 Nonetheless, dur-
ing the Maoist period a widespread, if basic, infrastructure for the provision of
public goods was essentially created from scratch, and brought about dramatic
improvements: life expectancy rose by nearly 33 years over the course of the period,
literacy rates increased dramatically, and rural infrastructure expanded.12
“Reform and opening” destroyed many of the Maoist-era institutions that pro-
vided public goods. Decollectivization undermined the basis for rural health ser-
vices and access to basic health services dropped dramatically. By 1984, only 5
per cent of villages had health care coverage via the Cooperative Medical
Scheme.13 In urban areas, state-owned enterprises struggled to adapt to the
Table 1: Types of Goods
Rivalrous Non-rivalrous
Excludable Private goods Club goods
e.g. clothing, food e.g. national parks, film screenings
Non-excludable Common-pool goods Public goods
e.g. water, timber e.g. public safety, highways, air quality
9 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999.
10 Duckett 2011.
11 Saich 2008.
12 Huang 2011; Plafker 2001.
13 Duckett 2011.
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demands of the market and cut costs by slashing the services they provided.
Private services emerged as a replacement, but access was limited and unequal.14
Whereas at the start of the reform period free local health care in the countryside
was nearly universal – in 1975, 85 per cent of the population had access to care –
coverage had dropped to just 10 per cent by 2005.15 This situation more or less
remained the case for decades, and life expectancy rates and other measures
were virtually constant for much of the reform period.
The central government’s renewed attention to providing public goods in the
early 21st century represented the convergence of two sets of policy priorities.
The first was an attempt to ameliorate rural–urban inequality, the second a desire
to rebuild (albeit on a more limited scale) the social safety net that had existed for
most of the Maoist period. Investment in rural infrastructure improved dramat-
ically, with investment in rural roads growing from 35.8 to 124.2 billion yuan
between 2001 and 2004, and infrastructure investment exploding after 2008 to
offset the effects of the global financial crisis.16 Rural health insurance, largely
destroyed by decollectivization, was also revived. Whereas in 1993 only 6.6 per
cent of rural residents had health coverage, in 2011 the New Cooperative
Medical Scheme (xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao zhidu 新型农村合作医疗制度)
covered 832 million people.17 The central government also invested in subsidies
and fee exemptions for poor students, urban health and workplace injury insur-
ance, and a welfare programme for the poorest citizens called the Minimum
Living Standard Scheme (dibao 低保). These programmes, largely implemented
by county governments, have grown at a rapid pace. For example, by 2011,
the dibao covered more than 50 million people.18 Villages, once the primary
providers of rural public goods, continue to play a sizeable role in providing
some public goods (the construction of local roads and irrigation projects, for
instance), and funding for these projects remains limited.19 However, the increas-
ing centralization of rural public goods has changed both the amount and the
funding structure of these goods. Overall investment in village public goods
and the share of investment that comes from higher levels of government have
both increased substantially (from 350 yuan per capita in 1997 to nearly 1,000
yuan in 2008). Nearly 75 per cent of these funds now come from the township
level and above.20
14 Wagstaff et al. 2009. Duckett (2011) questions whether economic reform can be blamed for the dismant-
ling of rural health services, arguing that a 1981 change in health policy was the more proximate cause.
Nonetheless, the “economic reform paradigm” remains the dominant explanation for the dramatic col-
lapse of these services.
15 Michelson 2012.
16 Liu, Chengfang, et al. 2009; Michelson 2012; Zhang, Yumei, Wang and Chen 2013.
17 Liang et al. 2012.
18 Golan, Sicular and Umapathi 2014.
19 For a detailed description of village-level investment in public goods projects, see Zhang, Linxiu, et al.
2006.
20 Oi et al. 2012.
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What We Know About the Present
Village elections and the provision of public goods
The literature on the local provision of public goods consistently finds that
elected village officials provide better public goods than appointed ones, and
that more democratic election procedures are associated with better provision.
Two categories of explanations, which I term electoral accountability and
resource mobilization, provide potential causal mechanisms linking democracy
to better public goods.21 Electoral accountability can take several forms.
Villagers may be better than higher-level officials at monitoring local officials.
When village heads are accountable to villagers (who may vote them out of office
for poor performance), they are less likely to get away with misuse of funds
because their wasteful spending is more likely to be observed. As a result, the
implementation of village elections has led to greater investment in the public
goods that villagers care about, such as irrigation in farming villages.22 The
increased transparency that elections create also decreases wasteful spending,
an effect that is magnified when the village head shares power with other local
elites.23 Other work in this vein argues that direct election makes representatives
more accountable to villagers and results in higher spending on public goods – so
long as the position of village representative is relatively lucrative.24 Positive
“neighbour effects” – such that more investment in public goods in nearby locales
motivates officials to provide better public goods in their own – are also induced
by village democracy.25 These effects have changed over time as rural China’s
economic policy environment has shifted. More democratic village governance
(measured by the frequency of villagers’ meetings and the election of village
cadres) had no effect on levels of expenditure on public goods before the imple-
mentation of tax-for-fee reform, but led to higher levels afterwards.26
These studies suggest that elections induce an “electoral connection” that
makes cadres understand and respond to villagers’ policy preferences.27 A second
body of work on accountability to voters treats the provision of public goods as
“pork-barrel politics,” a tool for buying votes on election day. Because public
21 Above the village level, career incentives also play an important role in officials’ decisions despite the
absence of meaningful elections. In order to maximize their promotion prospects, officials expend effort
on goals that higher levels of government regard as “hard targets” (Edin 2003a; 2003b; O’Brien and Li
1999; Rosenberg 2015), and time investment decisions to maximize their likelihood of being promoted
(Guo, Gang 2009). These incentives have important implications for the provision of public goods (as
well as for the enforcement of policies for ensuring social stability, promoting economic growth, and
other national priorities). Because the literature on promotion incentives focuses on rural expenditure
and on policy implementation by township- and county-level officials in general, rather than on the spe-
cific topic of public goods provision, it is outside the scope of this article. Interested readers should refer
to Göbel 2011 and Guo, Gang 2009 for useful overviews of this literature.
22 Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011.
23 Zhang, Xiaobo, et al. 2004.
24 Kung, Cai and Sun 2009.
25 Agostini, Brown and Zhang 2010.
26 Sato 2008.
27 Manion 1996.
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goods benefit the entire community rather than just a small group of elites, they
help officials to mobilize a large number of voters, as do efforts to redistribute
village income towards the poor.28 Renfu Luo et al. find that elected village offi-
cials spend more on village infrastructure than do appointed officials; the authors
argue that cadres are more likely to be re-elected when they distribute “pork” – in
the form of public goods – to their constituents.29 These findings are contested,
however, by research that looks at the distribution of projects across natural vil-
lages within a given administrative village. While both the village head and the
village Party secretary use their positions to distribute pork to their home natural
villages, they pay a price for doing so: village leaders who pander to their neigh-
bours are less likely to be re-elected.30
The second mechanism, resource mobilization, refers to the village head’s abil-
ity to compel villagers to contribute to public goods. Unsurprisingly, wealthier
villages invest more in public goods than do poor villages.31 However, the avail-
able resources may be endogenous to the relationship between officials and villa-
gers. In an interesting side-note to their main findings, Monica Martinez-Bravo
et al. find that villagers pay more towards public goods when the village head
is elected rather than appointed.32 Resource mobilization for the provision of
public goods can also be an impetus for (rather than an outcome of) village elec-
tions. China’s economic liberalization means that the state can no longer fund
itself by extracting monopoly rents from the command economy, and instead
must rely on “taxation by consent” to pay for public goods.33 But, villagers
may be unwilling to make these contributions without a greater input into
their use, resulting in the creation of elected village committees (cunmin huiyi
村民会议).
Social networks and the provision of public goods
A second set of findings concerns the relationship between social networks and
the provision of public goods. Citizens use social pressure to hold officials
accountable, even when democratic accountability is limited. Lily Tsai finds
that groups which are “encompassing” – open to all within the village – and
“embedding” (meaning that village officials participate in the group) offer higher
“moral standing” to officials who provide high-quality public goods.34 More
recent work agrees but focuses narrowly on the participation of village officials
in lineage groups.35 These social ties benefit villagers, who receive better public
28 Martinez-Bravo et al. 2012; 2014. Indeed, public goods expenditures may themselves be a redistributive
tool that decreases intra-village inequality (Shen and Yao 2008).
29 Luo et al. 2010.
30 Mu and Zhang 2011.
31 Kung, Cai and Sun 2009.
32 Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; 2014.
33 Yan 2011, 49.
34 Tsai 2007a; 2007b.
35 Chen, Jie, and Huhe 2013.
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goods, but also help the officials who provide these goods: working with social
groups to “coproduce” public goods improves village officials’ perceptions of
local state authority, and makes officials more optimistic about citizens’
compliance.36
Social ties between lower- and higher-level officials also improve the provision
of public goods. Village and township officials with strong ties to higher-level
officials may effectively lobby their superiors for resource transfers that can be
devoted to public goods projects.37 And, social ties between provincial Party sec-
retaries and provincial elites may shift the Party secretaries’ preferences away
from those of the central government and closer to those of provincial elites, lead-
ing them to spend more on public services. Surprisingly, they do so even though
they may incur a career penalty for prioritizing provincial social welfare needs
over the central government’s policy goals.38
Social ties between citizens may affect the quality of local public goods as well.
Consistent with much of the research described in the previous section, Gerard
Padro i Miquel and his co-authors find that elections increase the expenditure
on public goods using funds raised by the village, but show that this effect is smal-
ler in religiously fragmented communities. One possible explanation is that reli-
giously homogenous villages are better at holding officials accountable.
However, religiously diverse villages may also have a lower demand for public
goods, with villagers preferring to pay for goods and services that only benefit
their own religious group.39 Qin Tu and his co-authors reach a similar conclusion
in their study of the reconversion of forest land to private farmland after the end of
a government-funded “grain to green” programme.40 “Kinship trust” leads farmers
to prioritize private benefits for themselves and their clan members (and thus to
convert forests into farmland for their private use), whereas individuals with gen-
eral trust in the whole community also value public goods and are more likely to
maintain reforested land. Finally, similar to both Lily Tsai and Jie Chen and
Narisong Huhe, Yiqing Xu and Yang Yao find that strong lineage groups improve
the provision of village public goods.41 However, they find little evidence that these
ties hold officials accountable to citizens, arguing instead that officials who belong
to large clans can overcome collective action problems and compel their fellow clan
members to contribute to public goods instead of free-riding.
Provision of public goods and the local political economy
The third set of conclusions evaluates the effects of recent economic policy
changes on the provision of public goods. Tax-for-fee reform eliminated a long-
36 Tsai 2011.
37 Newland 2015; Zhou, Xueguang 2012.
38 Persson and Zhuravskaya 2012.
39 Padro i Miquel, Qian and Yao 2012.
40 Tu et al. 2011.
41 Tsai 2007a; 2007b; Chen, Jie, and Huhe 2013; Xu and Yao 2015.
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standing source of rural discontentment, but also diminished village resources for
public goods.42 Several sources find that tax-for-fee reform had a negative effect
on village-level provision of public goods because villages could not pay for these
goods themselves and funding from county governments decreased.43 Ethan
Michelson agrees that tax reform posed a serious threat to village-level provision,
but argues that this was a “short-run” effect in the mid-2000s and that “longer-
run trends have been, on balance, positive.”44
If tax-for-fee reform hurt the provision of public goods by diminishing local
funding sources, more recent policies that have increased available funding
have enabled improvements in rural public goods. Michelson argues that the
large-scale economic stimulus programme put in place to limit the effects of
the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy dramatically increased spend-
ing on rural infrastructure and public goods and services.45 This rapid inflow of
new funds improved these services and ameliorated longstanding state–society
tensions. Bruce Dickson sees this increased investment in public goods as part
of a broader attempt to update the “China model” in the wake of the financial
crisis, in the hope that increased investment in public goods will forestall
demands for political reform.46
The abolition of school fees (2006) also affected public goods provision. In a
national survey, this policy change increased citizens’ preference for state-funded
education. Lü Xiaobo argues that this shift in attitude was driven by citizens’
growing awareness of the policy change, not by the material benefits citizens
received.47 This increased policy awareness has had important implications for
citizens’ support of the CCP regime as citizens’ trust in the central government,
but not in the local government, has increased.
The fiscal relationship among different levels of the Chinese party-state also
affects the quality of local public goods provision. Economic decentralization cre-
ates cross-pressures that both help and hinder: on the one hand, local leaders may
understand the needs of their communities better (and feel more obligated to
serve these communities) than do provincial elites; on the otherhand, decentral-
ization leaves cash-strapped localities largely responsible for funding their own
public goods and services, which can undermine public goods provision. One
study finds greater evidence for the first hypothesis: the infant mortality rate is
lower in provinces that grant counties greater fiscal autonomy and where county
governments take on a relatively large share of total provincial expenditure.48
Finally, non-state actors play an increasingly important role in the provision of
public goods owing to a policy shift towards collaborative service delivery. The
42 Yep 2004.
43 Li 2008; Luo et al. 2007; Sato 2008.




48 Uchimura and Jütting 2009.
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2002 Government Procurement Law allowed local governments to contract with
the private sector (including for-profit firms and non-profit organizations), and
the law had an almost immediate effect. From 2002 to 2004, about one-third
of government expenditures on services went to outsourced services. This change
reflects the Chinese government’s desire to become a regulator rather than a dir-
ect service provider.49 It is also a response to social and demographic shifts
(rural-to-urban migration and a large aging population) that have made trad-
itional place-based state services untenable.50 However, power remains firmly
in state hands: non-governmental organizations still have little say in the policy
process, local governments typically contract with firms and social organizations
that already have close ties to the state, and outsourcing contributes to the state’s
legitimacy by “co-opting external players and stakeholders.”51 Findings on the
effects of outsourcing are mixed: some suggest that outsourced services are
often low quality and poorly regulated, whereas others find that outsourcing low-
ers costs and improves the quality of services.52
What Don’t We Know? Limitations of the Existing Literature
These sets of findings comprise a rich scholarly conversation on the causes and
consequences of rural public goods provision. However, the concept of public
goods, as the term is used in the literature on rural China, has fallen victim to
“conceptual stretching.”53 Two problems have emerged as a result. First, the lit-
erature addresses fundamentally different concerns than work on the same topic
in other contexts, inhibiting cross-national comparison. And second, although
dozens of China scholars use the term “public goods,” they often mean quite dif-
ferent things.
Problems of conceptualization
To understand some of these problems, it is useful to return to the orthodox def-
inition of public goods given above. A public good is non-rivalrous (one person’s
use of it does not diminish its availability to others) and non-excludable (the good
is available to all, and no one can be prevented from enjoying its benefits). To
what degree is the literature on the provision of public goods in China consistent
with this definition? While some work is careful to focus on true public goods,
much does not, or else lumps together a variety of public services and infrastruc-
ture projects with varying degrees of “public good-ness,” resulting in a substantial
disconnect between the main arguments of the comparative literature on the pro-
vision of public goods and the arguments advanced by China scholars.
49 Jing 2008; Li 2008.
50 Simon and Teets 2012; Teets 2012.
51 Jing 2008, 126; Jing and Savas 2009; Teets 2012.
52 Simon and Teets 2012; Zhang, Mengzhong, and Sun 2012.
53 Collier and Mahoney 1993.
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China does face some distinctive challenges when it comes to providing public
goods. Wherever formal accountability is weak, officials may have little incentive
to provide goods at all, or may use public funds for personal enrichment – an
explanation for underprovision that may not apply to democracies.54 But, this
in itself does not explain the China literature’s inconsistency with other work
on public goods. Indeed, research on provision of public goods in other contexts
illustrates that many of the same dynamics (free-riding, a reluctance to share pub-
lic goods across ethnic and other identity lines, and so on) exist in autocracies and
democracies alike.55
Non-rivalrousness. A handful of studies of public goods in China have focused on
goods that are truly non-rivalrous. Efforts to prevent desertification in the
north-west, for instance, benefit everyone who lives in the area, as do “grain to
green” reforestation programmes.56 Many other studies include measures of
true public goods – centralized village sanitation facilities or dumpsters,
management of publicly owned village forests and grasslands, and potable
drinking water, to name a few examples – within an index designed to measure
the overall quality of public goods provision.57 However, these measures are
often lumped together with other categories of public expenditure that are not
necessarily public goods. Take the example of paved village roads. As the
epigraph to this article highlights, expenditures on paved roads do not
necessarily benefit villagers, and how public these goods really are likely
depends on which roads local governments choose to pave. This is not to say
that commonly used measures like public expenditure on road construction
necessarily violate the non-rivalrousness requirement. Instead, it is a call for
future researchers to complement quantitative measures with qualitative
inquiry into the substantive meaning of these measures on the ground, and to
differentiate more clearly between public expenditures and public goods.
Furthermore, most existing work on the provision of public goods treats the
administrative village as the unit of analysis, despite the fact that the non-
rivalrousness condition does not hold across different natural villages within a
single administrative village. Village resources are limited, and projects that bene-
fit one natural village diminish the resources available to others. Future work
would thus do well to investigate the distributional patterns of public spending
within a single geographic-administrative unit; the question of who benefits
may well reveal more than do the myriad studies of aggregate village spending.58
54 Xu and Yao 2015.
55 For a discussion of public goods in another non-democracy, see Khwaja 2009.
56 Tu et al. 2011; Zhou, Li 2004.
57 See, for instance, Chen, Jie, and Huhe 2013; Kung, Cai and Sun 2009; Luo et al. 2007; 2010; Mu and
Zhang 2011; Tsai 2011.
58 Mu and Zhang’s 2011 study is, to my knowledge, the only source that looks at public spending at the
level of the natural village.
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The importance of these distributional patterns was clear in my fieldwork in
Yunnan province, where local governments were often cash-strapped and the
funds available for public goods and services quite limited. One county middle
school, for instance, relied on donations from a local cement factory to com-
plete new construction projects at the school. The school’s principal, who
was politically well-connected and skilled at using his influence to benefit the
school, had succeeded in improving the school’s physical infrastructure through
these kinds of connections.59 But, the resources for such public–private part-
nerships were finite, and schools whose leaders lacked the political acumen
of this particular principal were unable to make similar improvements to
their infrastructure. These distributional questions are central to the quality
of rural public services but suggest that the distribution of these services is gov-
erned by quite a different logic than truly non-rivalrous goods like water and
air quality.
Non-excludability. The degree to which so-called public goods in China fulfil the
non-excludability criterion also varies substantially. By lumping together goods
and services that can be targeted to specific recipients with those that cannot,
much of the existing literature makes it difficult to assess whether the problems
of non-excludability are actually relevant to rural China. Indices that combine
true public goods with ones that can be limited to contributors may be useful
for understanding how much local governments spend on a range of public
goods and services, but they muddy our understanding of the patterns of
provision and use that actually result from this spending. If the quality of
so-called public goods is poor, is it because they are overused, as we would
expect of non-excludable goods? Or because citizens refuse to contribute to
their upkeep? By contrast, the quality of excludable goods might suffer owing
to imperfect markets or factors that make it difficult for buyers to assess their
value accurately. Disaggregating these different types of goods would open up
new avenues of research on the distinct mechanisms that undermine (or
improve) the quality of each type.
The dynamics of rural education and health service provision illustrate some of
the problems with treating these services as public goods. Some of the most fre-
quently used measures of so-called public goods – spending on teachers’ salaries,
number of teachers, number of hospital beds per capita, spending on medical
clinics – ignore the fact that citizens can be (and frequently are) excluded from
using these services in several ways. First, citizens’ access to health services in
the countryside is largely determined by their ability to pay. Although the New
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) has increased access to rural health care
by diminishing the cost to citizens, citizens typically pay for services in cash up
front and are later reimbursed by their local health insurance office. This
59 Interview with middle school principal, Yunnan province, 2011.
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payment structure imposes an insuperable barrier to medical care for typically
cash-strapped rural families.60 The scheme’s low reimbursement rate for cata-
strophic illnesses also makes it difficult for the sickest individuals to afford
care. One study found that in 2007, patients with medical expenditures greater
than 10,000 yuan, although promised a reimbursement rate of over 40 per
cent, were in fact reimbursed just 2.18 per cent from the NCMS; another study
found that inpatient stays were reimbursed at just 15 per cent.61 In the typology
of types of goods I describe above, medical care in rural China is closer to a club
good than to a public good.
Education also rarely fits the classic model of a public good. The nationaliza-
tion of nine years of compulsory education and the “two exemptions and one
subsidy” (liang mian yi bu 两免一补) policy designed to defray school costs for
poor students have increased the degree to which basic education can be consid-
ered a non-excludable good. However, the distribution of education spending
across schools and across students suggests that education spending is also
more similar to a club good than to a public good. One reason is the unequal
resource distribution within schools. Local officials and other well-connected
residents lobby to place their children in the highest-performing teachers’ classes.
Nominally equal, they receive more resources and better instruction than other
classes, and have fewer disruptive students.62 Of course, this is not just a rural
phenomenon: parents across China pay informal fees to get their children into
the best classes and the most elite schools, with these fees reaching US$130,000
at the most desirable Beijing schools.63
Problems of measurement
Measuring quality, or measuring graft? It comes as no surprise to students of
Chinese politics that local governments misallocate resources. Even when higher
levels of government exercise relatively strict oversight, county governments are
adept at inflating payrolls and fabricating budgetary shortfalls in order to
maximize the grants and loans they receive.64 It is thus puzzling that much of
the literature on rural public goods provision in China takes local government
expenditure as the key indicator of quality.65 Another common measure of the
provision of public goods – the number of new public projects – is vulnerable to
similar problems. Officials frequently undertake wasteful projects simply to
prove to their superiors that they are taking initiative, but this says little about
the quality of services to citizens. Indeed, new projects may come at the expense
60 Interview with health economist, Beijing, 2011.
61 Zhang, Linxiu, Yi and Rozelle 2010, 102; Yi et al. 2009.
62 Interview with middle school English teacher, Yunnan province, 2011.
63 Gao 2014.
64 Liu, Mingxing, et al. 2009.
65 Examples include Oi et al. 2012; Shen and Yao 2008; Zhang, Xiaobo, et al. 2004.
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of high-quality public services as officials invest resources in cosmetic efforts
instead of improving existing services.66
In one poor countywhere I conducted fieldwork in Sichuan province, for instance,
the county government invested substantial resources in creating a beautifully paved
and tree-lined road to impress visiting officials who came into the county from the
prefectural capital. The road won a provincial award for its beauty but had little
effect on citizens’ daily lives – few citizens owned cars and road travel on the county
road was infrequent. The roads that were heavily used – the ones connecting the
county seat to several townships within the county –were unpaved and in poor con-
dition, but because these roadswere unlikely to be used by higher-level officials, they
remained neglected.67 While expenditures or the number of kilometres of paved
roads might suggest the presence of an effective and public service-oriented county
government, the disconnect between the services that the government provided and
the ones that citizens actually needed suggests that these measures do not provide a
complete or valid picture of public service quality.
Whereas much, although certainly not all, existing research has focused on
spending on public goods, future scholarship should pay greater attention to a
broader range of public goods outcomes, and especially outcome measures that
are relatively immune to self-serving manipulation by local officials. Local
experts can provide useful guidance regarding the types of measures that are
least vulnerable to manipulation by self-serving officials, and gradual improve-
ments in data quality and access mean that a greater range of such measures
are becoming available to researchers. Wherever possible, scholars should seek
independent assessments of the quality of public service projects rather than
rely on self-reported data from government officials. One set of scholars, for
instance, hired engineers to assess the quality of new road construction in a sam-
ple of rural locations; others have used satellite imagery to assess rural electrifi-
cation. Studies employing innovative measures such as these are more likely to
produce valid results than those which rely on the very measures that officials
are most keen to brag about.68
Treating localities as independent units. In the “politically centralized, but
economically decentralized” Chinese state, local governments spend money and
implement policies but they have limited policymaking power and report to the
next higher level of government. The literature on public goods provision,
however, focuses on villages in isolation, ignoring the web of interconnected
political units within which public goods are provided. These interconnections
are important because they may inhibit the provision of public goods. One
66 There is not necessarily a trade-off between the quantity and quality of public goods; the recent expan-
sion of rural infrastructure has led to improvements in both quality and quantity (Liu, Chengfang, et al.
2009). However, spending increases cannot be simply assumed to improve quality.
67 Interview with local NGO employee, Sichuan province, 2010.
68 Liu, Chengfang, et al. 2009; Min and Golden 2013.
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study found, for instance, that while village elections increase the share of public
spending in the village budget, they hurt the quality of public goods by
weakening fiscal sharing across villages – a necessity for public goods projects
that require coordination across multiple villages.69
There are clear incentives for the head of a given locality to provide public
goods. But, officials do not make decisions in a vacuum. Their ability to provide
public goods may be helped or hindered by their personal relationships with
higher-level officials and by the spending priorities of higher levels of govern-
ment. For example, when county officials decide to distribute limited monetary
resources to some townships but not others, these decisions determine the options
available to township officials, virtually ensuring that some townships will have
better public goods. And, as village schools have been replaced by larger, centra-
lized ones and national campaigns to modernize the countryside have brought
new resources to rural areas, the assumption that each locality provides public
goods in isolation has become untenable.
The Yunnan middle school principal mentioned above, for instance, was part
of a strong set of social networks with county officials, many of whom had begun
their careers as teachers and school administrators alongside the principal before
moving into positions in the county bureaucracy. These ties meant that the prin-
cipal had the ear of county officials when he needed it, and was able to lobby for
resources for the school effectively in informal ways. While his efforts were par-
tially self-serving, they also brought meaningful improvements (among them a
high-quality library and computer lab) to the school.70 But in the context of lim-
ited resources, the special attention that this school received came at a cost to
other schools, including those with more pressing problems (such as the high
dropout rates in some of the ethnic minority township schools). The top admin-
istrators of minority autonomous township schools in the same county had lim-
ited social or professional relationships with county-level officials – the county
government was overwhelmingly Han Chinese, and social ties were organized
largely along ethnic lines. This lack of social connections made it difficult for
them to lobby for resources as effectively as the more successful middle school
principal could.
Geographic context likewise affects citizens’ demand for public goods. Savvy
inhabitants “vote with their feet,” challenging the assumption that different local-
ities provide public goods independently. One county official, for instance,
assumed guardianship of her nephew so that he could attend school in her county
where schools were generally excellent, rather than in his county of residence.71
A women’s bureau official in a different county sent her daughter to school in
the prefectural capital because of the poor quality of the local school.72
69 Wang and Yao 2007.
70 Interviews with township middle school principal and with education bureau officials, Yunnan province,
2011.
71 Interview with county official, Yunnan province, 2011.
72 Interview with county women’s bureau head, Sichuan province, 2010.
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Although using public goods and services in one’s hometown may be easier than
seeking out better services elsewhere, citizens react rationally to differences in ser-
vice quality. They seek out access to high-quality services and avoid using poor-
quality ones. Thus, the quality of public services in one locality may affect the
quality of services in other, nearby localities by increasing (or decreasing)
demand for these services and by changing the makeup of the population that
uses the services that a given locality provides.
These patterns of interdependence, largely ignored by the existing literature on
the provision of public goods in rural China, cause thorny problems for quanti-
tative and qualitative analysis alike. Quantitatively, interference between units
makes inferring causality difficult. Because most quantitative work on the
provision of public goods in China does not address interdependence across geo-
graphic units, it is difficult to assess the validity of these studies’ findings. These
problems can be addressed by generating and testing explicit hypotheses about
the nature of the relationship between units, a useful corrective that future
work in this area should embrace.73 Qualitatively, future research should examine
the distributional patterns of public goods provision across multiple geographic
units within a single higher-level unit. Shifting our focus from the quality of
goods within a single unit to the variation across multiple, interconnected units
will open up new questions about who wins and loses when local governments
invest in public goods.
Level of analysis. Most likely owing in part to the relative ease of conducting
village-level research, existing work focuses almost exclusively on village-level
provision of public goods. In recent years, however, counties have assumed
greater responsibility for the public goods and services that were once the
responsibility of villages and townships. “Soft centralization” has led counties
to assume direct control over more and more township offices.74 Fiscal
recentralization, which began with the tax-for-fee reforms, has been
accompanied by political recentralization which has substantially limited the
autonomy of village and township officials. One survey found, for instance,
that by the mid-2000s villages did not make any investments in schools.75 This
has important implications for the study of public goods, as it suggests that the
existing scholarship’s focus on village-level spending and public goods projects
may quickly become – or may already be – irrelevant. It also means that a
new set of challenges to both the provision and uptake of public goods and
services is emerging. For example, while school centralization has improved
school facilities and teacher quality, it also may have negative social effects as
students are required to board away from their families.76 The burden of the
73 Bowers, Fredrickson and Panagopolous 2013.
74 Smith 2010.
75 Oi et al. 2012.
76 Chen, Xinxin, et al. 2011.
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boarding requirement may fall more heavily on some groups than others (the
head of one NGO suggested that the policy might have a differential impact
on girls, for example).77
Recommendations
Use a broader range of research methods
Our existing knowledge of public goods provision in China comes overwhelm-
ingly from village-level surveys. As discussed above, however, the measures
most often used in these surveys are vulnerable to manipulation by local officials
and may tell us little about whether these goods actually benefit citizens.
Complementing survey research with more qualitative work on the dynamics
of public goods could help scholars to identify better measures or new questions
that could improve future survey work on the topic. Efforts to identify measures
of public goods provision that are not vulnerable to manipulation by
officials have already begun and should be expanded. In other contexts, field
experiments have shed light on the causal mechanisms that lead to poor-quality
public goods; similar experiments could be useful in the Chinese context as well.78
Move above the village level
As discussed above, county governments now fund and administer many public
goods and services. The determinants of county-level public goods provision are
poorly understood, and these dynamics should be explored in future research.
For example, research on county and township governance has devoted signifi-
cant attention to the “cadre responsibility system” and the resulting incentives
for officials to generate economic growth,79 but whether this system incentivizes
the provision of public goods has not been systematically explored. Just as
importantly, the motivations of county officials that are unrelated to formal
career incentives have received little attention. As I describe above, research on
village-level public goods provision has explored both social and careerist factors
that motivate village officials. At the county level, however, existing research
largely treats officials as atomized individuals striving for rapid promotion.
While this may accurately depict the behaviour of a handful of upwardly mobile
officials, it ignores the large group of cadres who spend their entire careers in a
single county and who display little interest in promotion. My research suggests
that these officials are motivated by a different set of concerns including social
ties to ethnically and geographically defined groups of citizens and to co-workers,
a sense of self-worth tied to their job performance, and expertise and policy
77 Interview with head of public health NGO, Yunnan province, 2010.
78 Habyarimana et al. 2007.
79 Edin 2003a; 2003b; O’Brien and Li 1999.
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preferences determined by their prior work experience (often as township officials
or as teachers). In their multifaceted, often socially oriented motivations, these
officials bear a closer resemblance to Michael Lipsky’s “street-level bureaucrats”
than to the calculating, careerist actors the existing literature often depicts.80
Future research on the provision of public goods would do well to focus on
these additional motivations that are prevalent but poorly understood.
The interconnected nature of public goods provision across nearby localities
also warrants greater exploration. Geospatial (GIS) techniques, which enable
scholars to study correlations across space in sophisticated ways, have not yet
played a major role in research on Chinese politics,81 and could shed light on
the relationship between the provision of public goods across multiple units
within the geographic/administrative hierarchy.
Disaggregate public expenditures and public goods
The existing literature’s focus means that we know a great deal about government
spending on public goods, services and infrastructure. We know substantially
less, however, about some of the dynamics that have proven relevant to the
provision of public goods outside of China. Are public goods vulnerable to the
problems (overuse and insufficient provision) that plague them in other contexts?
Do particular social conditions (such as ethnic or religious diversity) undermine
the provision of public goods in China as they do in much of the world?82
Environmental governance provides one promising and underexplored topic
for scholars interested in rural public goods provision.83 The severity of
China’s pollution problems and the growing challenge of waste disposal in the
countryside – which one county Party leader characterized as one of the biggest
thorns in the side of the county party-state – make environmental issues an
important element of rural politics.84 Environmental quality is a true public
good: everyone benefits from clean air and water, regardless of their personal
contributions to environmental quality, and the benefits of a clean environment
do not diminish if they are shared across individuals. As a result, free-riding poses
a key challenge to environmental quality in the countryside.
Assess how public goods are used
Qualitative evidence suggests that the dynamics of public goods in China may
diverge substantially from what we would expect based on other contexts. In
some parts of China, the problem may be underuse rather than overuse of public
80 Lipsky 1980.
81 One exception is Guo, Shili, et al. 2014, although it also examines public expenditure in individual vil-
lages rather than assessing connections across units.
82 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007.
83 Two articles that explore environmental public goods are Tu et al. 2011 and Zhou, Li 2004, but both
have received little attention from other scholars of Chinese public goods.
84 Interview with county Communist Party office employee, Yunnan province, 2011.
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goods. In a Tibetan area with high infant mortality rates, for instance, the govern-
ment invested significant resources in improving the quality of and access to mater-
nal health services. Despite these investments, few women took advantage of the
free services, and health outcomes generally failed to improve. One cause of this fail-
ure lay in cultural factors that diminished demand for these services and in citizens’
scepticism towards officials’ attempts to encourage them to use public services.
Tibetan traditional birth practices made women in this area reluctant to give
birth away from home, and doctors in county hospitals were reluctant to make con-
cessions to traditional birth practices that could allay women’s fears about hospital
births. In addition, citizens across China are suspicious of the “advice” they receive
from paternalistic local officials ( fumuguan 父母官). Having been encouraged or
required to participate in numerous past public projects that cost them valuable
time and money and yet yielded little benefit, citizens are sceptical of officials’
attempts to convince them to use government services even when no viable alterna-
tives exist.85 Thus, the fundamental challenge that citizens’ behaviour poses to the
provision of public goods in some areas of China is not overuse, as traditional work
on the subject outside of China would lead us to expect, but rather the opposite.
Even when citizens do demand the services that local governments provide,
problems of overuse and free-riding have not occurred, even when officials
have expected them to – an important contrast to research on public goods in
other contexts that warrants further investigation. As the head of a public health
NGO with strong government ties explained, policymakers were concerned that
the NCMS would encourage individuals to overuse rural health services because
they would no longer bear the full cost of their care. When the programme was
piloted in a set of “test point” counties (shidian xian 试点县), however, these pro-
blems did not arise.86 What policies or social structures help to mitigate the pro-
blems of free-riding and overuse in China? Why do these factors ameliorate the
problems associated with some public goods, such as universal health insurance,
but not others, like environmental degradation? In other contexts, scholars have
explored the social and institutional variables that enable high-quality public
goods where we might not expect them.87 Exploring the relevance of these factors
to China, or identifying different ones that ameliorate collective action problems,
would help us to gain a better understanding of the true public goods dynamics in
China and bring the literature on this topic into closer conversation with the com-
parative literatures on political economy and local governance.
Conclusion
This paper seeks to accomplish three purposes. First, it surveys the literature on
public goods provision in rural China. It describes three sets of explanations for
85 Interview, head of public health NGO.
86 Ibid.
87 Glennerster, Miguel and Rothenberg 2013; Miguel 2004; Ostrom 1990.
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the variation in the quality of local public goods: local elections, social sanction-
ing and economic policies. Second, it identifies several limitations of the existing
literature that inhibit assessment of these findings’ validity. Different scholars
mean different things when they use the term “public goods,” a problem of “con-
ceptual stretching.” In terms of measurement, many studies of public goods rely
on easily manipulated measures of these goods and ignore the interconnected
nature of geographic-administrative units in the Chinese state. I suggest that a
second generation of literature on public goods in rural China could correct
these weaknesses by expanding the range of methods used to study public
goods, focusing on county-level public goods provision rather than almost exclu-
sively on villages, conceptually distinguishing between public goods and public
spending, and paying more attention to how public goods are used and not
just to how officials provide them.
Nearly a decade has passed since the Hu–Wen administration announced its
determination to “build a new socialist countryside.” Optimists see the ensuing
policies transforming villages for the better, although the changes that have
occurred are not nearly dramatic enough. These policy changes – and others
that will surely follow under the leadership of Xi Jinping 习近平 – will provide
fertile ground for a second generation of research on rural public goods, social
services and infrastructure. Greater conceptual clarity about the distinctions
between these categories, better measures of their quality, and increased engage-
ment with a variety of cross-national debates will ensure that this research is use-
ful not only to China scholars but also to students of political economy and
comparative authoritarianism as well.
Acknowledgement
This project was generously funded by the National Science Foundation
(Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant SES-1023953), the UC-Berkeley
Center for Chinese Studies, and the UC-Berkeley Institute for International
Studies. I am grateful for helpful feedback from Leonardo Arriola, Devin
Caughey, Sarah Garding, John Chung-en Liu, Kevin O’Brien, Laura Stoker
and two anonymous reviewers. All errors remain my own.
Biographical note
Sara A. Newland is an assistant professor of political science at Villanova
University. She received her PhD from the University of California, Berkeley,
in 2015. In 2015–2016, she was the China Public Policy Postdoctoral Fellow at
the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard’s
Kennedy School of Government.
900 The China Quarterly, 228, December 2016, pp. 881–904
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101600148X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Smith College Libraries, on 23 Sep 2021 at 17:59:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of








关键词: 中国; 公共物品; 农村政治; 政治经济学
References
Agostini, Claudio, Philip Brown and Xiaobo Zhang. 2010. “Neighbor effects in the provision of pub-
lic goods in a young democracy.” International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Discussion
Paper No. 01027.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. 1999. “Public goods and ethnic divisions.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4), 1243–84.
Bowers, Jake, Mark Fredrickson and Costas Panagopoulos. 2013. “Reasoning about interference
between units.” Political Analysis 21(1), 97–124.
Chen, Jie, and Narisong Huhe. 2013. “Informal accountability, socially embedded officials, and pub-
lic goods provision in rural China.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 18, 101–116.
Chen, Xinxin, Hongmei Yi, Linxiu Zhang, Di Mo, James Chu and Scott Rozelle. 2011. “Do poor
students benefit from China’s merger program? Transfer path and educational performance.”
Rural Education Action Project Working Paper No. 231, Stanford, CA.
Collier, David, and James Mahoney. 1993. “Conceptual ‘stretching’ revisited.” American Political
Science Review 87(4), 845–855.
Dickson, Bruce. 2011. “Updating the China model.” The Washington Quarterly 34(4), 39–58.
Duckett, Jane. 2011. “Challenging the economic reform paradigm: policy and politics in the early
1980s collapse of the rural cooperative medical system.” The China Quarterly 205, 80–95.
Edin, Maria. 2003a. “State capacity and local agent control in China.” The China Quarterly 173,
35–52.
Edin, Maria. 2003b. “Remaking the communist party-state: the cadre responsibility system at the
local level in China.” China: An International Journal 1(1), 1–15.
Gao, Helen. 2014. “China’s education gap,” The New York Times, 4 September.
Glennerster, Rachel, Edward Miguel and Alexander Rothenberg. 2013. “Collective action in diverse
Sierra Leone communities.” The Economic Journal 123(568), 285–316.
Göbel, Christian. 2009. “The peasant’s rescue from the cadre? An institutional analysis of China’s
rural tax and fee reform.” In Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (eds.), Regime Legitimacy
in Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability. New York: Routledge, 35–54.
Göbel, Christian. 2011. “Uneven policy implementation in rural China.” The China Journal 65,
53–76.
Golan, Jennifer, Terry Sicular and Nithin Umapathi. 2014. “Any guarantees? China’s rural minimum
living standard guarantee program.” World Bank Social Protection and Labor Discussion Paper
No. 1423.
Guo, Gang. 2009. “China’s local political budget cycles.” American Journal of Political Science 53(3),
621–632.
Guo, Shili, Shaoquan Liu, Renfu Luo and Linxiu Zhang. 2014. “Determinants of public goods invest-
ment in rural communities in mountainous areas of Sichuan province, China.” Journal of Mountain
Science 11(3), 816–824.
Which Public? Whose Goods? 901
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101600148X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Smith College Libraries, on 23 Sep 2021 at 17:59:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and JeremyMWeinstein. 2007. “Why
does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?” American Political Science Review
101(4), 709–725.
Hessler, Peter. 2010. Country Driving. New York: HarperCollins.
Huang, Yanzhong. 2011. “The sick man of Asia.” Foreign Affairs 90(6), 119–136.
Jing, Yijia. 2008. “Outsourcing in China: an exploratory assessment.” Public Administration and
Development 28, 119–128.
Jing, Yijia, and E.S. Savas. 2009. “Managing collaborative service delivery: comparing China and the
United States.” Public Administration Review 69(s1), S101–S107.
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz. 2009. “Can good projects succeed in bad communities?” Journal of Public
Economics 93, 899–916.
Kung, James, Yongshun Cai and Xiulin Sun. 2009. “Rural cadres and governance in China: incentive,
institution and accountability.” The China Journal (62), 61–77.
Li, Linda Chelan. 2008. “State and market in public service provision.” Pacific Review 21(3), 257–278.
Liang, Xiaoyun, Hong Guo, Chenggang Jin, Xiaoxia Peng and Xiulan Zhang. 2012. “The effect of
the New Cooperative Medical Scheme on health outcomes and alleviating catastrophic health
expenditure in China.” PLoS ONE 7(8), e40850.
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Liu, Chengfang, Linxiu Zhang, Renfu Luo and Scott Rozelle. 2009. “Infrastructure investment in
rural China: is quality being compromised during quantity expansion?” The China Journal 61,
105–129.
Liu, Mingxing, Juan Wang, Ran Tao and Rachel Murphy. 2009. “The political economy of ear-
marked transfers in a state-designated poor county in western China.” The China Quarterly 200,
973–994.
Lü, Xiaobo. 2014. “Social policy and regime legitimacy: the effects of education reform in China.”
American Political Science Review 108(2), 423–437.
Luo, Renfu, Linxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle. 2007. “Elections, fiscal reform and public
goods provision in rural China.” Journal of Comparative Economics 35(3), 583–611.
Luo, Renfu, Linxiu Zhang, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle. 2010. “Village elections, public goods
investments and pork barrel politics, Chinese-style.” Journal of Development Studies 46(4),
662–684.
Manion, Melanie. 1996. “The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside.” American Political
Science Review 90(4), 736–748.
Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2011. “Do local elec-
tions in non-democracies increase accountability? Evidence from rural China.” National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 16948.
Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2012. “The effects of
democratization on public goods and redistribution: evidence from China.” National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 18101.
Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2014. “Political reform
in China: the effect of local elections.” Unpublished manuscript.
Michelson, Ethan. 2012. “Public goods and state–society relations: an impact study of China’s rural
stimulus.” In Dali Yang (ed.), The Global Recession and China’s Political Economy. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 131–157.
Miguel, Edward. 2004. “Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya and Tanzania.”
World Politics 56(3), 327–362.
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. “Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods
in Kenya.” Journal of Public Economics 89(11–12), 2325–68.
Min, Brian, and Miriam Golden. 2013. “Electoral cycles in electricity losses in India.” Energy Policy
65, 619–625.
902 The China Quarterly, 228, December 2016, pp. 881–904
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101600148X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Smith College Libraries, on 23 Sep 2021 at 17:59:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Mu, Ren, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2011. “The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the alloca-
tion of public resources.” International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Discussion Paper
No. 01061.
Newland, Sara. 2015. “Diversity and Distribution: Essays on Local Governance and Public Service
Provision in Multiethnic China.” PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.
O’Brien, Kevin, and Rongbin Han. 2009. “Path to democracy? Assessing village elections in China.”
Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), 359–378.
O’Brien, Kevin, and Lianjiang Li. 1999. “Selective policy implementation in rural China.”
Comparative Politics 31(2), 167–186.
Oi, Jean C., Kim Singer Babiarz, Linxiu Zhang, Renfu Luo and Scott Rozelle. 2012. “Shifting fiscal
control to limit cadre power in China’s townships and villages.” The China Quarterly 211, 649–675.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Padró i Miquel, Gerard, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2012. “Fragmentation, public goods and elec-
tions: evidence from China.”National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No.
18633.
Persson, Petra, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2012. “Elite influence as a substitute for local democracy:
evidence from backgrounds of Chinese provincial leaders.” Unpublished manuscript.
Plafker, Ted. 2001. “China’s long – but uneven – march to literacy,” The New York Times, 12
February.
Rosenberg, Lior. 2015. “Why do local officials bet on the strong? Drawing lessons from China’s
village redevelopment program.” The China Journal 74, 18–40.
Saich, Tony. 2008. Providing Public Goods in Transitional China. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Samuelson, Paul. 1954. “The pure theory of public expenditure.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics 36(4), 387–389.
Sato, Hiroshi. 2008. “Public goods provision and rural governance in China.” China: An International
Journal 6(2), 281–298.
Shen, Yan, and Yang Yao. 2008. “Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?”
Journal of Public Economics 92, 2182–98.
Sicular, Terry, Yue Ximing, Björn Gustafsson and Li Shi. 2007. “The urban–rural income gap and
inequality in China.” Review of Income and Wealth 53(1), 93–126.
Simon, Karla W., and Jessica C. Teets. 2012. “Revolutionizing social service delivery in China: the
new policy of ‘contracting out’ to non-profit organizations.” International Journal of Civil Society
Law, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425349. Accessed 25 October 2016.
Smith, Graeme. 2010. “The hollow state: rural governance in China.” The China Quarterly 203, 601–618.
Solinger, Dorothy. 1995. “China’s urban transients in the transition from socialism and the collapse of
the communist ‘urban public goods regime’.” Comparative Politics 27(2), 127–146.
Teets, Jessica C. 2012. “Reforming service delivery in China: the emergence of a social innovation
model.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 17, 15–32.
Tsai, Lily L. 2007a. Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in
Rural China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tsai, Lily L. 2007b. “Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in
rural China.” American Political Science Review 101(2), 355–372.
Tsai, Lily L. 2011. “Friends or foes? Nonstate public goods providers and local state authorities
in nondemocratic and transitional systems.” Studies in Comparative International Development
46(1), 46–69.
Tu, Qin, Arthur P.J. Mol, Lei Zhang and Ruerd Ruben. 2011. “How do trust and property security
influence household contributions to public goods? The case of the sloping land conversion pro-
gram in China.” China Economic Review 22, 499–511.
Uchimura, Hiroko, and Johannes Jütting. 2009. “Fiscal decentralization, Chinese style: good for
health outcomes?” World Development, 37(12), 1926–34.
Which Public? Whose Goods? 903
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101600148X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Smith College Libraries, on 23 Sep 2021 at 17:59:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Wagstaff, Adam, Winnie Yip, Magnus Lindelow and William C. Hsiao. 2009. “China’s health system
and its reform.” Health Economics 18, S7–S23.
Wang, Shuna, and Yang Yao. 2007. “Grassroots democracy and local governance: evidence from
rural China.” World Development 35(10), 1635–49.
Xu, Yiqing, and Yang Yao. 2015. “Informal institutions, collective action, and public investment in
rural China.” American Political Science Review 109(2), 371–391.
Yan, Xiaojun. 2011. “The democratizing power of economic reform.” Problems of Post-Communism
58(3), 39–52.
Yang, Dennis Tao. 1999. “Urban-biased policies and rising income inequality in China.” American
Economic Review 89(2), 306–310.
Yep, Ray. 2004. “Can ‘tax-for-fee’ reform reduce rural tension in China?” The China Quarterly 177,
42–70.
Yi, Hongmei, Linxiu Zhang, Kim Singer, Scott Rozelle and Scott Atlas. 2009. “Health insurance and
catastrophic illness: a report on the new cooperative medical scheme.” Health Economics 18, S119–
S127.
Zhang, Linxiu, Renfu Luo, Chengfang Liu and Scott Rozelle. 2006. “Investing in rural China: track-
ing China’s commitment to modernization.” Chinese Economy 39(4), 57–84.
Zhang, Linxiu, Hongmei Yi and Scott Rozelle. 2010. “Good and bad news from China’s New
Cooperative Medical Scheme.” IDS Bulletin 41(4), 95–106.
Zhang, Mengzhong, and Jian Sun. 2012. “Outsourcing in municipal governments: experiences from
the United States and China.” Public Performance and Management Review 35(4), 696–726.
Zhang, Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang. 2004. “Local governance and public
goods provision in rural China.” Journal of Public Economics 88(12), 2857–71.
Zhang, Yumei, Xinxin Wang and Kevin Chen. 2013. “Growth and distributive effects of public
infrastructure investments in China.” In John Cockburn, Yazid Dissou, Jean-Yves Duclos
and Luca Tiberti (eds.), Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Asia. New York: Springer
International Publishing, 87–116.
Zhou, Li. 2004. “Public goods, environmental protection, and the development paradigm in rural
China.” China & World Economy 12(6), 86–97.
Zhou, Xueguang. 2012. “The road to collective debt in rural China.” Modern China 38(3), 271–307.
904 The China Quarterly, 228, December 2016, pp. 881–904
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574101600148X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Smith College Libraries, on 23 Sep 2021 at 17:59:42, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
